Whenever
there is a change in leadership in an organization, whether it’s a country or a
country club, there will be change. And change is, by its very nature,
disruptive. With every change of administration in Washington, government
workers must accommodate the inevitable changes., sometimes minor, sometimes
very substantive. Career personnel are committed to carrying out the policies
of the elected leadership, but sometimes that job is made difficult by the
pace, volume, and nature of the changes that a new administration brings.
During my 50 years of military and civilian government service, under every
administration from JFK to Barack Obama, I have lost track of the number of
times I’ve had to make significant changes in how I carried out my duties.
Everyone,
including the Foreign Service, faces changes in the way we do business when the
foreign policy leadership changes. As frustrating as it can be, it is what it
is.
.
Disruption means
change: Sometimes Cosmetic, Sometimes Cataclysmic
During
my thirty years as a Foreign Service Officer, in positions from junior consular
officer to ambassador, I observed and experienced the turbulence that came with
five presidential administrations, and since my retirement in 2012, I’ve
followed with interest the changes underway with the current administration.
Sometimes the changes were merely cosmetic, consisting of relabeling programs
that were longstanding, but, at other times, the changes were dramatic.
The
Reagan Administration practiced a form of ‘out-of-the-box’ disruptive
diplomacy, but Reagan had a clear goal and even though he sometimes used
militant rhetoric, was willing to change when the situation called for change.
In addition, he had an excellent foreign policy inner circle.
George
H. W. Bush entered office in 1989, a time of seismic changes in the global
situation, with the USSR breaking up and the Cold War ending, ushering in what
he called the ‘new world order.’ Bush, however, was not given to militant
rhetoric or grand gestures, preferring instead a deliberate, cautious approach.
While he was cautious with his rhetoric, he did cause some disruption because
of his tendency to have direct contact with foreign leaders often leaving the
diplomatic corps to learn things from the foreign press...
Bill
Clinton took office in 1993, and his foreign policy direction was to rely on
regional and international organizations. Much of the disruption during his two
terms came from his conflict with congress over war powers, and the
administration’s failure to act in response to the genocide in Rwanda, which,
after he left office, he acknowledged was a failure on his part. Establishment
of relations with Vietnam was perhaps the high point in his tenure, and
expanded opportunities for many Foreign Service Officers who were Southeast
Asian specialists.
When
George W. Bush assumed the presidency in 2001, his foreign policy focused on
stronger relations with Latin America, Mexico in particular, and a reduction in
US nation-building efforts. One of his earlier moves, withdrawal from the Kyoto
Protocols, caused a brief diplomatic scramble as our people abroad had to
explain our position to host nations. Objections to the International Criminal
Courts, and the possibility of it being used to target Americans for propaganda
purposes, with threats of reduced assistance to countries who did not support
our position created problems for diplomats who had to approach host countries
what amounted to a ‘take-it-or-leave-it bullying’ offer.
In
2009, the administration of Barack Obama outlined a foreign policy based on
cooperation with allies, a global coalition of partnerships to address global
issues, such as the Paris Agreement on the Environment, and an emphasis on soft
power instead of military solutions to problems. He did not immediately
repudiate past policies, including some that many of our allies disagreed with,
and 805 of the previous administration’s politically appointed ambassadors were
retained for varying periods of time, ensuring continuity in our relations with
their host countries.
And,
that brings us to the present administration of Donald J. Trump, which took
office in January 2017. From day one, and even during the campaign in 2016, we
have seen a Heisenberg Principle level of uncertainty and disruption in US
foreign policy, with policy pronouncements often announced via early-morning
Twitter posts, without the benefit of interagency coordination. These actions
have caused significant shifts in long-standing policies, forcing diplomats on
the ground to scramble to explain their meaning to our allies
The Short- and
Long-term impacts
Since
January 2017, there has been an exodus of experienced senior career FSOs from
the State Department, which exacerbates existing problems, particular relating
to providing career guidance to new hires. In the short term, these vacancies
have to be filled with often inexperienced mid-level people, who are not
lacking in intellect or will, but who don’t have the wealth of experience and
depth of contacts needed. This is further complicated by the lack of a clear
policy. While ‘Make America Great Again,’ is an interesting slogan—albeit
bringing to mind the discredited ‘America First’ policy of the pre-World War II
years—it is not a policy.
The
potential long-term impact is even more distressing.
Continued
efforts to reduce the State Department budget, which is barely sufficient at
the best of times, impairs the ability to staff our missions abroad. The
administration often seems unaware of the many services our diplomats offer Americans
that have nothing to do with politics. Consular services are not just
immigration. Consular officers help American travelers and expatriates in ways
that seldom get mentioned in the media, from replacing lost passports to
issuing birth and death certificates. Foreign
Commercial Service Officers and their State Department economic officer
colleagues assist American businesses in entering foreign markets,
understanding foreign commercial environments, and settling business disputes.
If we reduce this American presence abroad, we eventually reduce our ability to
level the playing field for American business abroad, and we leave Americans
traveling or living abroad without an essential lifeline.
Another
long-term impact of the administration’s actions that no one seems to be
considering is this: who will implement this administration’s policy
abroad—assuming it can eventually develop a coherent policy. It might be barely
possible, but hardly effective, for one person to run a big company, but it’s not
possible for one person to run a country. Domestic issues alone are
beyond the scope of a single individual’s ability, and when it comes to the
myriad of activities that go into the foreign affairs mix, it’s a fools’ errand
to even contemplate going it alone.
How Can the
Foreign Service Survive?
The
Foreign Service currently faces an existential threat. Are we prepared to
accept this new reality, and more importantly, do something about it? It’s not
just the continued survival of the Foreign Service as a viable institution
that’s important either. We must also consider the continued ability to provide
essential services to Americans abroad, and to serve as the eyes, ears, and
voice of the United States in places around the globe.
Working
with the congress and other stakeholders, we need to take action to prepare our
FSOs and Foreign Service Specialists, not only to survive for the next two
years, but to prosper. We must prepare junior- and mid-level officers and
specialists to perform effectively at more senior levels much earlier in their
careers. This requires more than traditional tradecraft training, It requires a
sustained program of career education that begins on day one of an officer or
specialist’s employment.
This
does not mean that we should junk current programs—at least, not all of
them—but we should add programs that are designed to instill and reinforce the
core values and skills that people require to be effective diplomats..
Courses
in mentoring, counseling, ethical decision making, leadership, and planning
should be mandatory for all personal at all grades. The A-100 course, for
instance, should include basic instruction on these subjects, as should the
senior leadership courses and the Ambassadorial and DCM/Principal Officer
Seminars.
Mentoring
and counseling are important for developing and motivating subordinates, and
it’s no longer possible to rely on the apprentice system of the past; there
simply will not be enough senior, experienced people to support it.
Current
ethics training is necessary, but in today’s complex ethical environment, not
sufficient. Our people need to be able to act and make decisions consistent
with core American values while preserving their own personal moral values. Additional
education is required to enable them to operate effectively in the gray area of
moral uncertainty and value conflict, and they must have options beyond surrender
integrity or resign.
FSI
provides leadership training which is fairly effective. I say effective, but, I
think there should be more participation by experienced practitioners. Mandatory
leadership training should also be required for all tenured FSOs and all
specialists who wish to compete for leadership positions.
Benjamin
Franklin, one of America’s first diplomats, said, ‘If you fail to plan, you
plan to fail.” At the same time, there’s an old military saying ‘no plan
survives first contact with the enemy.’ I’m not sure who said it first, but
it’s true. Every event, every crisis is unique, and has to be dealt with in a
unique way. So, what’s the good of a plan? Planning helps to focus people on
the organization’s goals and puts everyone at the same starting point, so that
in a crisis, efforts to deal with it are coordinated and coherent. Planning
disciplines the mind, so that, in a crisis, with a short planning time frame,
people can identify the problem, marshal needed resources, and deal with the
problem in a coherent and timely manner. Planning requires one to identify the
problem or goal, assess different courses of action, determine logistic and
administrative requirements and drawbacks, and make decisions. This
disciplining of the thought process, when a common part of the organization
experience, helps in crises. While the planning time frame is much narrower
when the balloon goes up, it still applies. Identify the crisis, determine the
desired end state, marshal required resources, and execute.
These
modest recommendations would, I believe, address many of our short- and
long-term issues. The Foreign Service faces hard times, and at the end of the
next two years will be a severely weakened institution that will have to be
rebuilt. We shouldn’t, however, seek to rebuild it exactly as it was. We should
strive to build a new and better Foreign Service. One that is resilient, and
ready for any mission, anywhere. This we owe the American people.
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